Pricing
of grazing on public range lands has been the subject of controversy since fees were first charged by the U.S. Forest Service in 1905. Fees charged by the Forest Service and the U.S. Grazing Service (now the Bureau of Land Management) have often been used as a prime example of misallocation of resources. This alleged misallocation stems from policies which ostensibly underprice grazing and restrict the transfer of grazing permits.
The purpose of this paper is to examine: (1) some of the history leading to present policy; (2) problems associated with present policy; (3) a theory of political action and the mechanism by which changes in policy take place; and (4) prospects for changes in grazing fee policy.
Grazing Fees
The policies surrounding the grazing fee controversy are the product of an interaction between various interest groups and lawmakers. The evolution of grazing fee policy is characterized by incremental changes (Dutton, 1956; Foss, 1959) . Grazing was originally permitted on Federal lands at no fee as a means of promoting use of idle land resources with the hope that some gain to society would be realized.
Forest Service
Fees.-By 1877 the policy of free use was being questioned, but a system to lease 1917, 1918, and 1919 . By 1920 the minimum fee for cattle was $0.60 per annum and the maximum was $1.50. Comments by members of congress, who felt fees were too low and who favored increased fees, had assumed such proportions by 1920 that the House Committee on Agriculture made efforts to increase fees as much as 300%.
In 1920, the Forest Service initiated a study to determine a fair basis for grazing fees. This study led to incremental increases in fees in 1928, 1929, 1930, and 1931 . In 1933, a plan to set a base fee and adjust this up or down according to current market prices was adopted. The base fees averaged 14.5$/month for cattle and 45$/month for sheep. However, average fees on privately owned range in the tenyear period 1913 to 1923 were determined to be 24.6$/tow month (Dutton, 1956) . This means that the base rent charged by the Forest Service was only about 59% of the competitive rent in the same period.
Bureau of Land Management
Fees. -Provision for control of grazing on much of the remaining public domain was made by the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934. Grazing fee policy on Taylor Grazing lands, like that on Forest Service lands developed incrementally and was moulded by the workings of interest groups and legislators.
Original fees set at the time the Taylor 300 Grazing Districts were established were 5#/AUM. These fees were not meant to be revenue producers, but were meant to cover costs of administration and would be raised only as administration costs rose (Fulcher, 1966 
UnderPricing and Misallocafion

Under Present Policy
Underpricing in this paper will be assumed when the marginal value product (MVP = Marginal physical productivity of input x price of output) is larger than the marginal factor cost (MFC or price of the input). The shape of the MVP curve ( Fig. 1 ) reflects decreasing additions to livestock production with increases in stocking rate. The shape of the MFC curve reflects the increasing cost of maintaining each additional animal as stocking rate becomes heavier. The optimum level of grazing "g" and the optimum leasing price "p" occur when the added revenue from the last added animal unit of grazing (MVP) equals the additional cost of this added amount of grazing (MFC). Thus a rancher leasing his private land would attempt to get a price equal to "p". Leasees would attempt to bargain for a price less than "p", and only the most efficient renters could pay "p". Underpricing occurs when rents are less than "P".
This example (Fig. 1 ) assumes a particular range site, range condition, kind and class of livestock, and set of utilization practices. Also changes in range forage supplies and prices of inputs and outputs would alter the optimum level of grazing and leasing price.
Misallocation occurs when a resource in limited supply does not go to the most productive alternative;
i.e., the person who could pay the highest price. The arguments in support of the contention that there is misallocation on Federal lands under present policy are convincing.
The reasons commonly cited are: (1) transfer restrictions, and (2) underpricing.
Transfer restrictions are manifested in non-price rationing under the doctrines of commensurability and priority of use. Under this non-price rationing, it has been argued, there are more people wishing to graze government lands at present fees than there are grazing resources available and fees are below equilibrium level (that level which would be reached in a freely competitive market).
That these permits themselves have a value which they could not have if the fee were exactly equal to the marginal value product (MVP) of the resource is also evidence of underpricing and misallocation.
Gardner (1959) (1965) showed that when all costs are taken into account there is no significant difference in total utilization costs per AUM. The small differences that do arise are probably attributed to a discounting due to the uncertainty of tenure of permits.
Effects of Present Policy
In Fig. 1 all costs were taken into account in MFC; rents or interest on investment, management costs, costs of maintaining or restoring productive capacity, etc. On Federal lands the rancher only assumes fee costs and some associated non-fee user costs, but these costs are essentially constant for a given range. Thus, MFC on Federal lands is essentially constant and is a straight line which does not turn up (fee lines in Fig. 2 ). These costs are lower than those which would be assumed by a land owner or those under competitive bid. When the rancher only assumes the constant fee and non-fee user costs, net returns are maximized at q2. However, to keep the range from deteriorating and to keep restoration costs down, government range managers (like the private land owner) must restrict grazing to the vicinity of ql. If there are user interests in addition to livestock interests, i.e., recreation, wildlife and watershed, the grazing rate may have to be cut back (say) to go.
A simple elaboration of Fig. 2 will illustrate some of the effects of present policy and fees. The fee consistent (under optimum allocation) with stocking rate ql is AD. This fee would allocate returns to the forage owners according to the respective resource contribution to ranch operation.
Under present policy and fees, AB is the grazing fee; and BD represents the amount by which the grazing fee is underpriced.
This underpricing allows the permit itself to take on a price (a capitalized value, i.e., income (BC) +-interest rate). Part of this underpricing (CD) is also capitalized into base property value (CD + interest rate).
It has been argued on occasion that ranchers using public range are subsidized by the Federal Government.
While it is true that a rancher grazing public ranges at the time public grazing fees were established received a windfall gain when he sold his ranch or borrowed money with his ranch property as collateral; it is also true that buyers and the old owners have assumed an inflated capital structure. The fact that part of the "underpricing" is capitalized into base property and part into permits is evidence of this artificial or inflated capital structure. This capital structure arises because ranchers have paid a competitive price in a competitive market for the privilege of grazing public lands. The fact that they paid a competitive price "in the market" disputes the contention that the rancher grazing public land is HOOPER subsidized.
In this light, the argument that the government should raise fees to eliminate subsidization is not valid. The argument that ranchers using Federal lands are getting rich at the expense of the Federal Government is also not valid. When the value of grazing permits is taken into account the return to ranchers for their money invested in their operations is very low usually ranging from a minus figure to a plus 5% rate of return (Caton, 1962; Roberts and Topham,, 1965; Roberts and Blanch, 1966) .
The valid argument for increased fees (and the one the Bureau of the Budget is using) is that the Federal Government should receive a fee more consistent with the lands' producing or carrying capacity (Zwick, 1967) . And with this there should be no quarrel.
The problem is how to implement a change in the fee structure and adequately handle the capitalized values in grazing permits and/or commensurate property.
Effects of a Change in Fees
A private landlord usually does not compensate tenants for an increase in rent, likewise there is a popular belief that permittees on government range should not be compensated. It has also been suggested that an increase in fees would result in a capital gain to society (Roberts and Topham, 1965 ). An increase would also, however, result in a capital loss to ranchers using Federal range. If the fee were in fact set at AD (Fig. 2) into the permits or into their base property or for investments in improvements would be penalizing the permittee for a Government policy not of the ranchers own making, but a product of our political system.
The State Board of Equalization in California has recently sustained an administrative ruling which affirms the taxability of grazing rights on Federal lands as possessory interest (Bean, 1967) . The possibility that permittees may be taxed on their leasehold interest in Federal grazing lands reinforces the contention that permittees should be compensated for loss of capitalized value due to fee increases or condemnation by eminent domain.
Proposed Alfernafives
If it is deemed desirable to change fee policy, several alternatives for fee changes have been advanced (Brewer, 1962; Gardner, 1959; Roberts, 1963) to deal with the various problems outlined above and include:
(1) Eliminating fees altogether on the grounds that society ought to encourage ranchers to use public forage because it would be wasted if they did not use it.
(2) Allow public grazing lands to pass into private ownership.
(3) A one-step fee increase to the full value of the forage with no compensation for capital loss of investments in grazing permits or commensurate property. (4) A one-step increase with compensation for capital loss.
(5) Sealed bids (this would solve the fee problem and the problem of allocation of use rights, but has no provision for compensation for capital loss). (6) Because in most instances permits have not assumed the full expected value, set fees at some level above current fees so that new freely transferable permits could be issued which would have the same value as the old permit (Gardner, 1963) . This proposal would eliminate the capital loss to present permittees and eliminate transfer restrictions, but does not have adequate provision for future increases in fees.
(7) Small increases in fees over a number of years.
Prospecfr for Change A theory of political action may shed some light on the prospects for a change fin policy. Downs (1957) has postulated that politicians seek office solely to enjoy the income, prestige, and power that goes with running the governmental apparatus.Politicans and their parties formulate policy primarily as a means of gaining votes. Downs further postulates that politicians usually do not seek office in order to carry out certain preconceived policies or to serve any particular interest group, rather they formulate policies and serve interest groups in order to gain or stay in office. They sell policies for votes instead of products for money, and attempt to maximize votes much as a producer attempts to maximize profits.
In the past when a large percentage of society was farm or ranch oriented, or not more than one generation removed from the farm, policies which favored agriculture were vote getters. Now only a small percentage of society is actively engaged in farming and ranching and many citizens are more than one generation removed from agriculture. Thus, policies which favor agriculture are beginning to lose voter appeal. Also the roles of consumers and producers in in-GRAZING FEES fluencing policy is beginning to change. Citizens are more likely to exert influence as producers than as consumers. This is because nearly every citizen derives all his income from one or two sources and hence any government action affecting these sources is of vital interest. In contrast, each person spends his income in a great many policy areas so a change in any one is of little interest.
This situation is changing as society is getting more leisure time. It is now rational for more people with "free" time to "look out" for their consumer interests as well as their producer interests. Thus, it is that we are experiencing a tremendous boom in interest group activity in recreation and changes in policy to reflect this interest.
With the decreased influence of farmers and ranchers in government due to redistricting, the efforts of the Bureau of the Budget to establish user fees more in line with user benefits, and the advent of PPBS (Planning Programming Budgeting System), there can be little doubt that policy will be changed and grazing fees will be raised. The question now becomes in what manner. In the review of the history of grazing fees it was pointed out that changes have been incremental, i.e., no radical changes "overnight". Lindbloom (1959) has shown this to be a rational policy-making procedure. A wise policy maker expects that his policies will achieve only part of what he hopes. but he also realizes it will produce unanticipated consequences he would have preferred to avoid. If he proceeds through a series of successive incremental changes he avoids serious and lasting mistakes, does not go far beyond his knowledge, and can quickly change again in the event of error. Thus, new policy is built on old policy and the test of a good policy is not if it achieves 303 desired ends, but whether it is acceptable.
There will be increases in grazing fees as interest groups express their desires and/or politicians think they can maximize votes by changing policy. Policy and fees should, however, continue to be changed incrementally and will be changed only aq the balance of power shifts from livestock producers to other interests and the new policies can be agreed upon and supported.
In the days when grass was free and cattle sold by the head it was economically rational for livestock producers to graze very heavily (q, in Fig. 2 ). For a long time society encouraged, through no or low fees the use of public range land which might otherwise go unused. As these lands became desired for uses other than grazing, thus raising marginal factor cost (MFC) of grazing to society, pressures began to mount for control of stocking and higher fees to equate MFC and marginal value product (MVP). Though it may have been and still is economically desirable for the Federal Government to receive a rent more consistent with the lands' producing capacity, politicians seeking to maximize votes have been able to maintain low fees and the use of Federal lands for their constituents. It is evident that, because of interest group activity it is now becoming politically expedient to identify with other user interests.
However 
